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Abstract.
Failure of medical device (MD) software can have potentially catastrophic effects, 
leading to injury of patients or even death.  Therefore regulators penalise MD 
manufacturers who do not demonstrate that sufficient attention is devoted to the areas 
of hazard analysis and risk management (RM) throughout the software lifecycle.  
This paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to compare how thorough 
current MD regulations are with relation to the Capability Maturity Model Integration 
(CMMI®) in specifying what RM practices MD companies should adopt when 
developing software. The second objective is to present a Risk Management Capability 
Model (RMCM) for the MD software industry, that is geared towards improving 
software quality, safety and reliability. 
Our analysis indicates that 41 RM sub-practices would have to be performed in order 
to satisfy MD regulations and that only an additional 8 sub-practices would be required 
in order to satisfy all the CMMI® level 1 requirements. Additionally, MD companies 
satisfying the CMMI® goals of the RM process area by performing the CMMI® RM 
practices will not meet the requirements of the MD software RM regulations as an 
additional 20 MD specific sub-practices had to be added to meet the objectives of 
RMCM. 
 Keywords: Software Risk Management, Software Quality, Software 
Engineering, Software Process Improvement, Software Reliability, Software 
Design, Computing Methodologies, Medical devices, United States Food and 
Drug Administration.
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1. Introduction
Software is becoming an increasingly important aspect of medical devices and MD 
regulation. Software enables highly complex systems to be built. However, complexity 
is the enemy of safety (McDermid 1993), therefore strict adherence to well documented 
processes is important within the domain of MD software. Medical devices can only be 
marketed if compliance and approval from the appropriate regulatory bodies of the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (FDA/CDRH 2005, FDA Regulations 2006, 
FDA/CDRH 1999) (US requirement), and the European Commission under its Medical 
Device Directives (MDD) (European Council 1993) (CE marking requirement) is 
achieved. MD companies must produce a design history file detailing the software 
components and processes undertaken in the development of their products. Due to the 
safety-critical nature of MD software it is important that a highly efficient RM process 
is in place within MD companies. The risk of patient injury from software defects is a 
concern due to the manufacture and deployment of increasing numbers of software-
embedded devices (Bassen et. al. 1985, Crumpler & Rudolph 1997, Munsey 1995, US 
General Accounting Office 1997). There have been a number of major MD product 
recalls over this past 25 years that were the result of software defects (Bovee et. al. 
2001). For example, four people died and two were left permanently disfigured from 
massive radiation overdoses due to software defects in the Therac-25 line of medical 
linear accelerators (Leveson & Turner 2001). A major contributor to such defects is the 
presence of software quality assurance issues (Bassen et. al. 1985). The CDRH 
reviewed MD recalls due to software failures from 1983 to 1991 and estimated that 
90% were due to inadequate design and 19% were caused by inadequate change control 
(US Department of Health and Human Services 1992).  Therefore, to reduce the risk of 
failure it is important that the software design process includes efficient RM practices.
Software quality may be defined and measured in many ways.  For MD companies, 
one way to define and measure software quality is in terms of the risk of software-
containing devices in exposing patients, operators, bystanders, service personnel or the 
environment to hazards.  Although such devices are developed to increase the well-
being of patients, on occasion they fail to operate properly, or are misused in ways that 
are associated with injuries and death (Rados 2003). According to the Institute of 
Medicine report ‘To Err is Human’ (Kohn et. al.  2000), between 44000 to 98000 
people die throughout the world in hospital from preventative medical errors. The 
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report also says that more people die every year as a result of medical errors than from 
motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer or AIDS. 
MD companies are responsible for ensuring that they take adequate precautions to 
produce safe and effective software that does not pose a severe hazard should a 
software-related failure occur.  Therefore, MD companies who market within the USA 
must ensure that they comply with the regulations for medical devices outlined by the 
FDA. They must also be able to produce sufficient evidence to support this compliance.
The FDA “is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, 
efficiency, and security of…medical devices…” (FDA’s Mission Statement 2007).  To 
this end, the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) has published 
guidance papers for industry and MD staff which include risk-based activities to be 
performed during software validation (FDA/CDRH 1999), pre-market submission 
(FDA/CDRH 2005) and when using off-the-shelf (OTS) software in a MD (FDA 
Regulations 2006).  Although the CDRH guidance documents provide information on 
which software activities should be performed, including risk based activities, they do 
not enforce any specific method for performing these activities.  
Within the MD industry, several predominant standards have emerged for performing 
risk-based activities including: ANSI/AAMI/ISO:14971 (ISO:14971), 
(ANSI/AAMI/ISO:14971 2007)  and ANSI/AAMI:SW68 (SW68) (ANSI/AAMI 2001) 
and more recently ANSI/AAMI/IEC:62304 (IEC:62304) (ANSI/AAMI/IEC 2006) 
which is based on SW68 and aims to both improve upon and replace SW68.  Previous 
research has asserted that both ISO:14971 and SW68 require that RM activities include 
software, without providing any detail on how it should be done (AAMI 2005, AAMI 
2004).  In 2005, the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation  
(AAMI) produced a Technical Information Report (TIR32)  (AAMI 2004)  on 
performing risk based activities in accordance with ISO:14971 to help rectify this 
situation.  The report focuses on “software system safety design issues” and provides 
insight into the key concepts behind performing various risk-based activities.  It also 
highlights many of the pitfalls associated with RM activities.  However, TIR32 does all 
this without committing to specific methods or documentation requirements when 
performing the various activities.  It clearly states that it “does not define any specific 
documentation requirements”. Likewise, the International Society for Pharmaceutical 
Engineering (ISPE), published a guide, GAMP 4 (ISPE 2001), which included guidance 
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for performing validation of software systems and risk-based activities.  The guide 
provides many of the RM high-level concepts with some detail and practical examples.  
It falls short in that it does not cover all the requirements necessary to achieve full 
compliance in the area of RM.
None of the standards or guides produced provide a one-stop-shop for MD software 
risk based activities making it harder for MD companies to quickly measure their 
capability with respect to software RM.  Although IEC:62304 acknowledges that risk is 
very well addressed in ISO:14971, it points out that there is a need for additional RM 
requirements to address software specific requirements.  IEC:62304 addresses these 
additional requirements but does so in the context of ISO:14971.  It is only through a 
combining the various standards that one may gain a complete picture of what is 
required for software RM.
This paper outlines a proposed RMCM for use by MD companies to assist them in 
producing safe and effective software.  It seeks to extract, interpret and combine the 
disparate knowledge within the MD industry and associated standards.  It does so in the 
context of the following regulations: ISO:14971, IEC:62304, TIR32, BS/EN:60601-1-4 
(BS/EN 2000) and GAMP 4, in addition to the CDRH (FDA specific) guidance 
documents.
Section 2 examines the need for the RMCM and how similar software process 
improvement (SPI) based models have been used within other safety-critical software 
industries. Section 3 presents an overview of the RMCM. Section 4 describes the 
development of the RMCM. Section 5 details the mappings that were performed 
between the MD regulations and the CMMI® (SEI 2006) for RM. This section describes 
the content of the RMCM including the capability level structure. It details what 
additional practices had to be added to the CMMI® RM process area in order to satisfy 
MD regulations, as well as what CMMI® practices are not required in order to satisfy 
basic MD regulatory requirements. Commentary is supplied indicating how the RM 
process adopted by MD companies could benefit by incorporating CMMI® practices 
that are not deemed necessary by MD regulations. Section 6 details a summary of the 
results from the research. Finally, section 7 contains our conclusions. 
2. Background and the contribution of this research
MD companies have to adhere to MD regulations in relation to RM. The main area of 
concern for MD companies in relation to RM is to ensure that the RM elements 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
2.
required by the FDA are in place rather than trying to improve their overall RM 
practices.  The majority of the literature available on MD RM discusses RM from a 
high level perspective where some of the key concepts of RM are discussed (Wood 
1999, Schmuland 2005, Elahi 1993) and the FDA’s role in the regulation of MD 
software is examined (Rados 2003, Rudolph 2003, Kim 1993, Theisen & Neill 2004, 
Ciarkowski 2000, Munzer 1988).  The literature’s focus is on what is and what can be 
done by the FDA to prevent MD manufacturers from releasing un-safe medical devices.  
Much has been done in the area of user-centred design (Johnson et. al. 2005) and how 
poor user interface design can render software applications unusable or lead to incorrect 
diagnosis of patients due to missing or incorrect information that is important to the 
diagnosis of the patient (Bates et. al. 1999, Tang & Patel 1994, Tierney et. al. 1987).  In 
fact, the FDA views this as a critical issue (Sawyer et. al. 1996) and has produced a 
guide specifically aimed at addressing human interface concerns through the design 
process (FDA/CDRH 2000).  Through such guidance it is hoped that the design of 
software will be driven by safety conscious decisions and consideration for potential 
human misinterpretation of results and misuse or abuse of the system, thus leading to 
safer software.  The consideration of how software may potentially be used or misused 
is one of several important practices required for any software RM model.
Other literature has focussed on the progression of the FDA in the regulation of MD 
software (Kim 1993, Eagles & Murray 2001).  This literature is interesting in that it 
presents the progression of key standards aimed at the MD sector from the perspective 
of the FDA.  It provides a good insight into the evolution of standards and establishes a 
number of core standards within MD RM.  
Wallace and Kuhn have conducted research into the reasons why MD software fails 
or has been recalled by the FDA (Wallace & Kuhn 2001).  The research analyses over 
15 years of recall data and discusses how the majority of MD errors are preventative by 
providing examples of prevention and detection techniques. The research does not 
directly discuss hazard analysis and RM but is useful in that it does discuss many of the 
techniques which are associated with risk mitigation such as inspections and reviews, 
traceability, code reviews, use of simulations, unit testing and interface testing.  
Through the examination of re-call data, the researchers provided some lessons into 
why MD software fails and how these failures can be prevented.
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Other research has been conducted into formal techniques for quantifying reliability 
of MD software and analysing risks associated with the devices (Voas et. al. 1993, 
Sayre et. al. 2001).  Again, this research is seen as complimentary to analysing MD 
software and producing safer software but is not, and does not claim to be, a complete 
replacement for existing RM practices.
The MD industry itself has identified the requirement for a guide and for practical 
examples for performing relevant MD software practices including RM. GAMP 4 
details RM practices that MD companies may adopt in order to comply with MD 
regulations.  However, no standards exist within the MD domain in relation to how 
such practices could be improved by incorporating practices from formal software 
engineering SPI models for RM. Previous research has investigated the suitability of 
using existing software quality assurance standards in order to achieve FDA compliance 
related to the areas of process management, requirements specification, design control 
and change control (Bovee et. al. 2001). However, the area of RM was not investigated 
and no specific SPI model has been developed for the industry. 
If we investigate other regulated industries such as the automotive and space 
industries we realise that these domains are not content with satisfying regulatory 
standards.  Instead, they have proactively developed SPI models specifically for their 
domain so that they may continuously improve the development of their information 
systems to achieve higher levels of safety, greater efficiency, and a faster time to 
market, whilst seamlessly satisfying regulatory quality requirements. The major SPI 
models that currently exist, namely ISO/IEC:15504 (ISO/IEC 2003) and CMMI®, do 
not address the regulatory requirements of either the MD, automotive or space 
industries. Therefore, a new SPI model was developed specifically for the automotive 
industry.  This model was based upon ISO/IEC:15504 and is referred to as Automotive 
Spice (Automotive SIG 2005). Likewise, a new ISO/IEC:15504 based SPI model was 
developed specifically for the space industry - this model is known as SPiCE for 
SPACE (Cass & Volcker 2000). Both of these models contain reference and assessment 
information in relation to how companies may improve their RM practices within their 
domain. 
This paper will not address the issue of developing an entire SPI model for the MD 
industry (a high-level structure for such a model is discussed in (Mc Caffery et. al. 
2005, Mc Caffery & Coleman 2007)), but shall instead focus upon the individual 
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process area of RM (this research extends the research presented in (Mc Caffery et. al. 
2005, Burton et. al. 2006)). This work develops a SPI model for RM within the MD 
industry, providing an opportunity to integrate the regulatory issues and SPI 
mechanisms to achieve improvements that are critical to the RM of software for 
medical devices.
3. Overview of the RMCM
The RMCM outlined in this paper was developed following an extensive literature 
review and input from a MD company. The primary focus of the research area as a 
whole is to investigate if the MD regulations for RM may be improved through 
adopting disciplined software engineering practices. This paper describes an integral 
part of this research by detailing the development of a RMCM that is based upon a 
formal SPI model. Upon development, the RMCM will be an extension of the RM 
process area within the CMMI®. This is specifically tailored to fulfil the RM regulations 
of the MD software industry. The RMCM may then be adopted by MD companies to 
improve their software development practices by providing them with a SPI model. 
This SPI model will also ensure that their hazard analysis and risk control procedures 
satisfy the current MD regulations and guidelines.
4. The Development of the RMCM
The RMCM was developed with assistance from a MD company who is bound legally 
by the regulatory bodies of the British Standards Institution (BSI) and the FDA 
(FDA/CDRH 2002).  The regulatory bodies regularly review this organisation’s process 
and procedures, through audits, to ensure the organisation is compliant with the 
regulations set out by the bodies. Therefore, the organisation possessed a solid base of 
documented process and audit feedback.
The organisation requested that a model should be created with a comprehensive and 
reusable software hazard analysis and RM procedure.  It was a requirement that the 
procedures should fully comply with the RM requirements set forth by both the FDA 
and BSI.  It was envisaged that this would lead to safer and more efficient software 
design and developed device.  It was also desirable that the resulting RM framework 
would satisfy the regulatory requirements of other regulatory bodies (if applicable).  
Therefore, the focus and content of the resulting framework could not be restricted to 
just FDA and BSI guidance documents.
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1.
In order to understand and define the scope of the RMCM, it was important that the 
authors gained both a broad and deep understanding of the concepts of RM in both the 
MD domain and the software engineering community.  The approach adopted was to 
perform an extensive literature review of existing regulatory guidance papers, industry 
guidance papers and standards which govern the MD software industry as well as SPI 
models from other industry sectors.  This in turn provided a solid and proven 
foundation upon which the model could be based.  
4.1. Structure of RMCM
The RMCM does not dictate a software lifecycle model.  It assumes the existence of 
software phases common to industry standard lifecycle models.  The phases include 
requirements management, design and development, verification and validation, 
release, maintenance and post production. Neither quality nor safety can be integrated 
into software as a final step in the software development process.  MD companies must 
take an approach which integrates hazard management and risk analysis into the entire 
software lifecycle.  This should begin at the requirements phase and continue through to 
product retirement. The approach taken must clearly demonstrate that serious 
consideration was given to all possible hazards posed by MD software. It must put in 
place appropriate risk reduction and mitigation techniques.  
The RMCM has been designed to be flexible in that relevant elements of the model 
may be adopted as required to provide the most significant benefit to the business. The 
model is based on the CMMI® and the regulations used to extend the CMMI®
framework are those of the FDA, ISO:14971, GAMP 4 and the 
ANSI/AAMI/IEC:62304 standard (IEC:62304) (MD software – Software life cycle 
processes) (ANSI/AAMI/IEC 2006).  EN 6061-1-4 (BS EN 2000) was also considered 
for the RMCM, to establish if there was additional knowledge within the standard 
which would complement the model.  Such information has been highlighted by the 
authors during the discussion of the models sub-practices in the subsequent sections. 
The RMCM contains an assessment method that provides a means of assessing the 
software engineering capability for the RM process area in relation to MD software 
(both application and embedded software). The RMCM is being developed as a 
foundation upon which to promote SPI practices into the RM process adopted by MD 
companies. This is an attempt to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of RM within 
MD companies through investigating the mapping of MD regulatory guidelines against 
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the CMMI® RM process area. The mappings between the MD regulatory guidelines and 
the CMMI® specific practices for the RM process result in the RMCM being composed 
of a number of goals and practices. Goals and practices may be either generic (relating 
to the entire organisation) or specific (relating directly to the RM process).  The RMCM 
determines what parts of the CMMI® RM process area (i.e. part A of Figure 1) are 
required to satisfy MD regulations (i.e. part B of Figure 1).  
The RMCM also investigates the possibility of extending the CMMI® process areas 
with additional practices that are outside the remit of CMMI®, but are required in order 
to satisfy MD regulatory guidelines (i.e. part C of Figure 1). Additionally, the RMCM 
provides MD companies with the opportunity to incorporate practices from the CMMI®
that are not required in order to achieve regulatory compliance but that would greatly 
enhance their RM process if they were included  (i.e. part D of Figure 1).
A- CMMI® Practices that are not mandatory for MD standards.
B- CMMI® Practices that are required for MD standards.
C- Non-CMMI® Practices that are required for MD standards.
D- CMMI® Practices that are not mandatory for MD standards – but if performed could contribute 
to the safety of the MD software or enhance the company’s RM practices 
Figure 1. Composition of the RMCM.
RMCM will help companies to measure their organisational RM capability and to track 
their progression against the following SPI capability levels:
(A) CMMI practices
Medical device 
regulations for RM
(C) Non-CMMI 
practices that are 
required for medical 
device standards
(B) CMMI 
practices that 
are required 
for medical 
device 
standards
(D) CMMI 
practices not 
required but with 
potential benefit to 
medical device 
software
CMMI practices not 
required for medical 
device standards
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 RMCM Level Med – Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy the goals and 
perform the practices required to meet the requirements of the various MD 
regulatory guidelines and standards associated with RM. This will involve 
performing some practices, which the CMMI® views as generic, although not to the 
extent of fulfilling any generic goals.
 RMCM Level 0 – Insufficient practices have been performed to satisfy the 
requirements of Level Med.
 RMCM Level 1 - Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy RMCM level Med 
and the CMMI® capability level 1 goal of performing the CMMI® RM base 
practices.
 RMCM Level 2 – Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy RMCM level 1 
and additionally perform CMMI® RM Advanced Practices, as well as the CMMI®
capability level 2 generic goal of institutionalising a Managed Process.
 RMCM Level 3 - Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy RMCM level 2 
and additionally the CMMI® Generic Goal to Institutionalise a Defined Process 
(CMMI® Generic Goal 3) for the RM process area.
 RMCM Level 4 – Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy RMCM level 3 
and additionally the CMMI® Generic Goal to Institutionalise a Quantitatively 
Managed Process (CMMI® Generic Goal 4) for the RM process area.
 RMCM Level 5 - Companies must demonstrate that a process area satisfies RMCM 
level 4 and additionally the CMMI® Generic Goal to Institutionalise an Optimising 
Process (CMMI® Generic Goal 5) for the RM process area.
Section 5 details a mapping of the MD standards and guidelines (these shall be referred 
to as MD regulations throughout the paper) to the CMMI® for the RMCM. This will 
demonstrate what CMMI® goals and practices are required in order to satisfy MD 
regulations for RM. Software development within MD companies could be improved 
by incorporating other CMMI® practices that are not required to achieve MD 
compliance. Details are provided in relation to how additional sub-practices (not 
included in the CMMI®) may be added where necessary to satisfy MD regulatory 
guidelines. RM goals and practices have to be performed to satisfy each of the RMCM 
capability levels.
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5. RMCM Goals, Practices and Sub-practices 
In this section we identify the goals that exist within the RMCM.  Tables will be used to 
illustrate the complete list of the RMCM practices and sub-practices for a particular 
goal. The tables also specify the RMCM capability level associated with each sub-
practice. Sub-practices that are displayed in bold italics in the tables are not present in 
the CMMI® but are required in order to fulfil MD regulatory requirements. 
The RM process area has three specific goals (SG): 
 SG1: Prepare for RM
 SG2: Identify and Analyse Risks
 SG3: Mitigate Risks. 
For each of these goals to be achieved, it is necessary for a number of specific practices 
(SP) to be performed.  
5.1. SG1: Prepare for RM
In order to fulfil SG1: Prepare for RM the specific practices of Determine Risk 
Sources and Categories; Define Risk Parameters; and Establish a RM Strategy must be 
performed. (For a more complete description of these sub-practices please refer to the 
RM process area section within the CMMI® (SEI 2006)). Table 1 provides the complete 
list of the RMCM sub-practices and their associated capability level for preparing for 
RM. 
Table 1. RMCM Sub-practices for Specific Goal 1 Preparing for RM
RMCM 
Sub-
Practice 
Number
Sub-Practice Source RMCM 
Level
Practice: Determine Risk Sources and Categories
1 Determine risk sources CMMI RM SP1.1-1 sub-practice 
1, ISO:14971  4.2, IEC:62304 
7.1.1 & 7.1.2
Med
2 Determine risk categories CMMI  SP1.1-1 sub-practice 2 Med
3 Determine software hazards IEC:62304 7.1,  ISO:14971 4.3 
and CDRH 
Med
4 Include failure in the OTS software as a potential 
hazard 
IEC:62304 7.1.2 (c) & 7.1.3 Med
5 Include hardware failures as a potential hazard IEC:62304 7.1.2 (d) Med
Practice: Define Risk Parameters
6 Define consistent criteria for evaluating and 
quantifying risk likelihood and severity levels
CMMI RM SP1.2-1 sub-practice 
1, IEC:62304 4.3, ISO:14971 4.4 
Med
7 Define thresholds for each risk category CMMI RM SP1.2-1 sub-practice 
2, ISO:14971 D.3.2 
Med
8 Define bounds on the extent to which thresholds are 
applied against or within a category
CMMI RM SP1.2-1 sub-practice 
3, ISO:14971 D.3.3
Med
Practice: Establish a RM Strategy
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9 Establish a RM Strategy CMMI RM SP1.3-1, IEC:62304 
5.1.7, ISO:14971 3.1
Med
10 Define the scope of the strategy and include those
life-cycle phases for which the strategy is 
applicable 
ISO:14971 3.4(a) Med
11 Define the policy for determining acceptable risks ISO:14971 3.4(d) Med
12 Include a verification plan  and activities as part 
of the strategy 
ISO:14971 3.4(e) and 6.3 Med
13 Outline the allocation of responsibilities ISO:14971 3.4(b) Med
14 Outline the requirements for reviewing the RM 
activities 
ISO:14971 3.4(c) Med
15 The RM strategy should include OTS IEC:62304 7.1.3 Med
16 Post-production queries and bugs be should 
analysed 
ISO:14971 9, IEC:62304 9.2(b) 
and CDRH 
Med
Table 2 summaries the mapping of the MD RM regulations against specific goal 1 of 
the CMMI® RM process area (Prepare for RM). It may be observed that 10 MD 
specific sub-practices will have to be performed in addition to all the CMMI® RM 
practices and sub-practices in order to satisfy the MD guidelines of this goal. However, 
the CMMI® specific goal 1 for RM would be fully satisfied by following guidelines 
required to adhere to MD regulations.
Table 2: Summary of RMCM Specific Goal 1 – Prepare for RM
Practice RMCM Sub-
Practice 
Numbers
CMMI®
Sub-
practices
CMMI® Sub-practices 
required to meet 
regulatory requirements
Additional Sub-practices 
required to meet regulatory 
requirements
Determine Risk 
Sources & 
Categories
1 – 5 2 2 3
Define Risk 
Parameters
6 – 8 3 3 0
Establish RM 
process
9 –16 1 1 7
Total 1 - 16 6 6 10
5.1.1. Determine risk sources & categories 
Table 2 illustrates that the RMCM practice for determining risk sources and categories 
items consists of 2 sub-practices that are required by both the CMMI® and the MD 
regulations (i.e. Level Med in table 1), plus 3 new sub-practices that are required by the 
MD regulations but not by the CMMI® (i.e. Level Med in table 1).
Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI® and the MD regulations (see Table 1):
Sub-practices 1 & 2. Determining the potential sources of risk and categorising them as 
activities that are required by both the CMMI® and the MD guidelines (see table 1). 
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However, the MD regulations require additional information in relation to factors that 
could result in software hazards. FDA guidelines recommend focusing upon safety as a 
primary source of risk. Other typical sources of risk that the MD guidelines recommend 
focusing upon are: cost, integrity and security. FDA guidelines also note that risk may 
be initiated by human factors, hardware faults, software faults, integration errors and 
environmental conditions.  MD guidelines also recommend that all potential causes and 
sequences of events that could result in a hazard should be documented. 
Risks should be organised into related groups as this will assist with consolidating sub-
practices in risk mitigation plans. A number of factors may be considered when 
determining risk categories. FDA guidelines advise similar factors to those 
recommended by the CMMI®, such as categorising risk for an entity, as well as for 
major components, subsystems, software, electronics and lifecycle stages. For example, 
FDA regulations stress that it is important to define risk-related functions when 
analysing requirements and to monitor this ongoing source of risk throughout the 
lifecycle process as requirements change. Additionally, IEC:62304 specifies that each 
safety requirement in the software be uniquely identifiable and traceable to risk 
mitigation measures (see section 5.2.1).
Sub-practices required by the MD regulations but NOT by the CMMI® (see Table 1):
Three additional MD specific sub-practices as defined in IEC:62304 were added in 
order to provide full coverage of the MD regulations.  These are as follows:
Sub-practice 3. The MD regulations identify hazard management as part of RM and 
request that hazards should be identified that could be the direct result of software 
failure or for which software implements a control measure.  Hazards should be 
identified from both normal and incorrect use of the software device and should be 
considered for patients, operators, service personnel, bystanders and the environment.  
EN 60601-1-4 recommends that the method used for hazard identification should be 
documented in the RM file (IEC 1985).
Sub-practice 4.  The MD regulations specify that OTS (Off-The-Shelf) software must 
be considered as a potential source for failure of MD software.  IEC:62304 specifically 
requires that where software of unknown provenance (SOUP) is used in the MD 
software, that any published SOUP anomaly list be evaluated to determine if any new 
hazards could be introduced as a result of the known anomalies. 
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Sub-practice 5. The MD regulations detail that hardware failures should be considered 
as a potential source of software failures.
5.1.2. Define risk parameters 
Table 2 illustrates that the RMCM practice for defining risk parameters consists of 3 
sub-practices that are required by both the CMMI® and the MD regulations. Therefore 
the MD guidelines demand similar effort and rigour to those demanded by CMMI® and 
a company satisfying MD regulations would also satisfy the specific practice for 
defining risk parameters.
Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI® and the MD regulations (see Table 1):
Sub-Practice 6. It is important to identify criteria that may be used for comparing risks 
and enabling risks to be prioritised. ISO:14971 guidelines identify parameters for the 
severity of harm (should the risk occur) and the likelihood of the occurrence for 
quantifying risk.  These criteria may be acceptable in the instance where a hardware 
failure may lead to a corresponding software failure and the likelihood can be 
reasonably estimated. However, IEC:62304, states that for software, if a hazard could 
arise from the failure of the software, the probably of such a failure shall be assumed to 
be 100 percent. Software safety is broken into three classes A, B and C. Class A 
represents a software item where failure would not result in injury or damage to health, 
B could result in non-serious injury and C could result in death or serious injury.  All 
software items are assigned a classification and all software items within a system are 
assumed to inherit the system’s safety class until they themselves have been evaluated.  
Any unclassified software items assume a class level C.  Many of the software lifecycle 
activities and associated tasks within IEC:62304 are directly linked to these software 
classifications.  
Sub-Practice 7.  The MD company must define thresholds against which all identified 
risks shall be measured.  
Sub-Practice 8. In terms of developing software for medical devices the parameter 
values for ‘severity of harm’ are very important and are defined and justified by the 
sponsor. The degree of detail and effort involved in RM and control should be in line 
with the ‘severity of the resulting consequences’ (should failure happen). Therefore 
most effort should be devoted to handling risks that have a ‘severity of harm’ level of 
major (Class C). As safety is of primary importance companies must ensure that 
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medical devices are produced that satisfy acceptable levels of risk and that this is not 
based upon probability.
5.1.3. Establish RM strategy 
Table 2 illustrates that the MD regulations are more stringent in terms of what 
constitutes a RM strategy and therefore additional sub-practices (other than those 
detailed in the CMMI®) will have be included within this practice in order to fulfil the 
objectives of RMCM. For example, the FDA guidelines specify that a strategy should 
include: potential sources of risk; appropriate techniques for risk analysis of software, 
electronics, biomaterials etc., such as fault tree analysis, failure modes and effects 
analysis; risk criteria, parameters and thresholds; risk control methods; & activities 
used to monitor the risks and whether risk controls were successful (FDA Regulations 
2006). Table 1 demonstrates that the RMCM practice for establishing a RM strategy 
consists of one sub-practice that is required by both the CMMI® and the MD regulations 
(i.e. Level Med), and 7 sub-practices that are required by the MD regulations but not by 
the CMMI® (i.e. Level Med).
Sub-practice required by BOTH the CMMI® and the MD regulations (see Table 1):
Sub-Practice 9. Establishing a RM strategy involves establishing and maintaining a 
strategy to be used for RM. Both CMMI® and the FDA require companies to have a 
RM strategy that is used to define risk analysis and control activities, which should be 
documented.  EN 60601-1-4 adds that if the plan/strategy changes during the course of 
development, a record of the changes shall be kept.  MD guidelines require that a RM 
strategy is adopted and request that MD manufacturers document:  an analysis of 
intended use of MD and software, a description of each identified risk; the severity 
level of the risk; the source of the risk; the risk control methods used and how they were 
implemented; tests used to confirm the success of the risk method used; and the severity 
level after the risk control method has been implemented.
Sub-practices required by the MD regulations but NOT by the CMMI (see Table 1):
Sub-Practice 10. To satisfy ISO:14971, the life-cycle phases for which the RM plan is 
applicable, should be identified and described within the plan.  
Sub-Practice 11. To satisfy ISO:14971, before a risk is deemed acceptable, it must be 
measured against a pre-defined acceptability policy, which should be outlined by the 
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RM plan. MD standards do not define acceptable levels and instead leave the decision 
to the MD manufacturer, who in turn must document their decision using existing 
standards, comparable levels of risk from devices in use, medical references and clinical 
study references where available.
Sub-Practice 12. To satisfy ISO:14971, the verification plan and activities should be 
included as part of the RM plan.
Sub-Practice 13. To satisfy ISO:14971, those responsible for the various RM and 
control activities should also be identified. 
Sub-Practice 14. To satisfy ISO:14971, the plan should also cover the requirements for 
reviewing the RM activities.
Sub-Practice 15. To satisfy IEC:62304, the RM plan should cover (Off-the-shelf) OTS 
software.
Sub-Practice 16. ISO:14971, IEC:62304 and the FDA guidelines recommend that post-
production queries and bugs should be analysed to safeguard against a risk scenario 
arising post-release that was not originally considered during development.
5.2. SG2: Identify and Analyse Risks
In order to fulfil SG2: Identify and Analyse Risks the following specific practices 
have to be performed: Identify risks; & Evaluate, categorise, and Prioritise risks (see 
Table 3).
Table 3: RMCM Sub-practices for Specific Goal 2 : Identifying and Analysing Risks
RMCM 
Sub-
Practice 
Number
Sub-Practice Source RMCM 
Level
Practice: Identify risks
17 Include a description of the intended use and any foreseeable 
misuse 
ISO: 14971 4.2 Med
18 Identify the risks associated with the cost, schedule, and 
performance in all appropriate product lifecycle phases
CMMI RM SP2.1-1 sub-
practice 1 
1
19 Review environmental elements that may impact the project CMMI RM SP2.1-1 sub-
practice 2
1
20 Review all elements of the work breakdown structure as part 
of identifying risks to help ensure that all aspects of the work 
effort have been considered
CMMI RM SP2.1-1 sub-
practice 3
1
21 Review all elements of the project plan as part of identifying 
risks to help ensure that all aspects of the project have been 
considered
CMMI RM SP2.1-1 sub-
practice 4
1
22 Document the context, conditions, and potential consequences 
of the risk
CMMI RM SP2.1-1 sub-
practice 5, ISO:14971 4.4
Med
23 Provide risk traceability: Identify risk traceability from the 
device level down to the specific cause within the software 
IEC:62304 7.3.3, ISO: 
14971 3.5 and CDRH
Med
24 Identify the relevant stakeholders associated with each risk CMMI RM SP2.1-1 sub-
practice 6
1
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25 At least one trained individual directly involved in the 
software development, with both relevant MD and RM 
knowledge shall participate in the RM activity to ensure that 
risks are adequately addressed.  This person(s) shall be 
identified on the report along with the date of the analysis
 ISO: 14971 3.2, 3.3 and 
3.4(b)
Med
Practice: Evaluate, categorise, and prioritise risks
26 Evaluate the identified risks using the defined risk parameters CMMI RM SP2.2-1 sub-
practice 1, ISO:14971 5
Med
27 Categorise and group risks according to the defined risk 
categories
CMMI RM SP2.2-1 sub-
practice 2, ISO:14971 5
Med
28 Prioritise risks for mitigation CMMI RM SP2.2-1 sub-
practice 3, ISO:14971 5
Med
29 The results of all the RM activities should be recorded and 
maintained in a RM file 
ISO: 14971 3.1 Med
Table 4 summaries the mapping of the MD RM regulations against specific goal 2
(Identify and Analyse Risks) of the CMMI® RM process area. It may be observed that 
in order to satisfy the MD regulations that not all of sub-practices of this CMMI® goal 
will have to be performed. However, in order to satisfy the objectives of the RMCM 4 
additional sub-practices had to be added (Table 3). Table 3 also illustrates that specific 
goal 2 of the CMMI® will not be satisfied by following the MD regulations (i.e. 
performing only the RMCM level Med sub-practices) as only 4 of the 9 CMMI® sub-
practices associated with this CMMI® goal are required for RMCM level Med. 
Table 4: Summary of RMCM Specific Goal 2 – Identify and Analyse Risks
Practice RMCM 
Sub-
Practice 
Numbers
CMMI®
Sub-
practices
CMMI® Sub-practices 
required to meet 
regulatory 
requirements
Additional Sub-practices 
required to meet regulatory 
requirements
Identify Risks 17 - 25 6 1 3
Evaluate, categorise 
and prioritise risks
26 - 29 3 3 1
Total 17 - 29 9 4 4
5.2.1. Identify risks 
Table 3 includes the complete list of RMCM sub-practices for identifying risks. From 
mapping the MD regulations against the CMMI® for identifying risks, it was discovered 
that unlike the specific goal 1 practices, not all of the CMMI® sub-practices are required 
in order to achieve MD compliance (i.e. 5 of the 6 CMMI® sub-practices are at level 1). 
However, the MD regulations request additional information in relation to usage, 
traceability and the participation of a software development team member in the RM 
activity. Therefore, additional MD specific sub-practices are required in order to 
achieve the objectives of the RMCM. Table 4 illustrates that the RMCM practice for 
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identifying risks consists of 1 sub-practice that is required by both the CMMI® and the 
MD regulations (i.e. Level Med), 3 sub-practices that are required by the MD 
regulations but not by the CMMI (i.e. Level Med), and 5 sub-practices that are required 
by the CMMI® but not by the MD regulations (i.e. Level 1). 
Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI® and the MD regulations (see Table 3):
Sub-Practice 22. Identified risks should be documented. However prior to identifying 
the risks, ISO:14971 requires all characteristics that could affect safety to be 
documented.  The acceptable level of residual risk will depend upon the intended 
purpose of the MD.  The documentation should include a description of the identified 
risk (details of the context and conditions) and the severity of the risk (potential 
consequences) should it occur.
Sub-practices required by the MD regulations but NOT by the CMMI (see Table 3):
Sub-Practice 17. To satisfy ISO14971, MD companies should assess the effect the risk 
will have upon patients, operators, bystanders, service personnel and the environment.  
Sub-Practice 23. ISO:14971, IEC:62304 and the FDA guidelines recommend that, as 
development progresses through the software development lifecycle, the status of 
existing risks should be updated and new risks should be identified. Risks should be 
identified for all predictable instances and follow established procedures, starting at the 
requirements stage of the lifecycle. MD regulations also request that the documentation 
should identify traceability from the device level down to the specific cause in the 
software and also provide traceability from the risk analysis, evaluation, 
implementation, and verification down to the final assessment of the acceptability of 
residual risks.
Sub-Practice 25. ISO:14971 specifies management must provide an adequate provision 
of qualified resources.  Those performing risk analysis should possess knowledge and 
experience of the MD, its intended use and RM techniques. Additionally, records of 
these qualifications should be maintained for future compliance inspection. The risk 
report should contain the identity of the person and organization that carried out the risk 
analysis along with the date of the analysis.  The IEC:62304 and ISO:14971 
requirements are not as comprehensive as CMMI® as they do not specify that each risk 
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is assigned an owner.  Therefore, a separate sub-practice is added to RMCM to reflect 
both IEC:62304 and ISO:14971 guidelines.
Sub-practices required by the CMMI® but NOT by the MD regulations (see Table 3):
Sub-Practice 18. Many factors that contribute to risk such as cost, integrity, security 
and safety should be considered. 
Sub-Practice 19. In addition to identifying software related issues, risks should also be 
identified for hardware faults and integration issues. The CMMI® acknowledges that it 
is important to review areas that are outside the scope of the project for risks.  
Sub-Practices 20&21. The CMMI® requires that all elements of both the work 
breakdown structure and the project plan should be reviewed to ensure that all aspects 
of the work effort and project are considered. There is no necessity to review the work 
breakdown structure and the project plan in order to achieve MD compliance for RM.
Sub-Practices 24. The CMMI® requires that stakeholders should be associated with 
each risk so that individuals are assigned responsibility for risks.  However, this is not 
necessary for MD regulatory compliance.
5.2.2. Evaluate, categorise, prioritise risks 
Table 3 includes the complete list of RMCM sub-practices and associated capability 
levels for evaluating, categorising and prioritising risks. From mapping the MD 
regulations against the CMMI® for this practice, we noted that the MD regulatory 
requirements exceed those of the CMMI®, as ISO:14971 additionally requests that the 
results of all the RM sub-practices should be recorded and maintained in a RM file. 
Therefore, in order to fulfil the objectives of the RMCM one extra sub-practice is 
required in addition to those demanded by CMMI® (see table 3). A company fulfilling 
MD regulations would also satisfy the CMMI® requirements for this practice. Table 3 
illustrates that the RMCM practice for evaluating, categorising and prioritising risks
consists of 3 sub-practices that are required by both the CMMI® and the MD regulations 
(i.e. Level Med), and 1 sub-practice that is required by the MD regulations but not by 
the CMMI® (i.e. Level Med).
Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI® and the MD regulations (see Table 3):
Sub-Practice 26. Parameters defined in the RM strategy are used to evaluate identified 
risks. MD companies adhering to FDA guidelines are required to determine risk using 
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the parameters of “severity of harm” (should the risk occur) and the “likelihood of 
occurrence”.  Emphasis is placed on the “severity of harm” parameter, as it may not 
always be possible to accurately estimate the software failure rate (which is directly 
related to the “likelihood of occurrence” parameter).
Sub-Practice 27. There is a necessity to group risks according to defined risk categories 
(e.g. entity, components/subsystems, software etc.) to assist risk handling. 
Sub-Practice 28. As a project may have multiple risks, it is important that risks are 
prioritised so that the highest priority risks receive the most attention and effort. MD 
guidelines specify that risks should be prioritised according to the severity of the 
resulting consequences and that the amount of effort devoted to creating design 
solutions that reduce or eliminate the risk should be based upon the value of this 
parameter.  GAMP 4 combines the risk classification with the probability of detection 
to further prioritise the risk.  The probability of detection is broken out into three levels: 
“low” where the detection of the fault condition is perceived to be unlikely, “medium” 
where detection is reasonably likely and “high” where detection of the fault is very 
likely.  The logic is that risks that are not easily detected, are the most vulnerable.  
Therefore, they become higher priority and should be dealt with first. For example, a 
medium level risk with a low probability of detection would be deemed high priority 
due to the low detection rate.  In contrast, a medium level risk with a high probability of 
detection would be a low priority risk.  By focussing on the higher priority areas first, 
the quality of the system is improved by reducing the overall probability of failure. 
Sub-practices required by the MD regulations but NOT by the CMMI (see Table 3): 
Sub-Practice 29. ISO:14971 requests that the results of all the RM activities should be 
recorded and maintained in a RM file.  EN 60601-1-4 suggests that a RM summary file 
should also be created to summarise the RM activities. The RM summary file contains 
each identified hazard, its initiating cause, mitigation techniques used to control risk 
and an evaluation of effectiveness of the risk controls.  Because the RM file will already 
contain this information, the summary report is seen by the authors as useful but not a 
necessity and as such has not been highlighted as a separate sub-practice.
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5.3. SG3 Mitigate Risks
In order to fulfil SG3: Mitigate Risks the following specific practices have to be 
performed: Develop Risk Mitigation Plans & Implement Risk Mitigation Plans (see 
Table 5).
Table 5: RMCM Sub-Practices for Specific Goal 3: Mitigate Risks
RMCM 
Sub-
Practice 
Number
Sub-Practice Source RMCM 
Level
Practice: Develop Risk Mitigation Plans
30 Determine the levels and thresholds that define when a risk 
becomes unacceptable and triggers the execution of a risk 
mitigation or contingency plan
CMMI RM SP3.1-1 
sub-practice 1, 
ISO:14971 6.5 & 7
Med
31 Identify the person or group responsible for addressing each 
risk
CMMI RM SP3.1-1 
sub-practice 2
1
32 Determine the cost-to-benefit ratio of implementing the risk 
mitigation plan for each risk
CMMI RM SP3.1-1 
sub-practice 3
1
33 Develop mitigation plans for all risks CDRH Guidelines
(Supersedes CMMI 
RM SP3.1-1 sub-
practice 4)
Med
34 Develop contingency plans for all risks CDRH Guidelines 
(Supersedes CMMI 
RM  SP3.1-1 sub-
practice 5)
Med
35 Add software risk control measures to the software 
requirements document
IEC:62304 7.2.2 Med
36 Identify segregation between software items essential to risk 
control and show how segregation is effective
IEC:62304 Med
37 Mitigations should be verified ISO: 14971 6.3 and 
IEC:62304 7.3.1
Med
38 Results of the verification should be documented ISO: 14971 and 
IEC:62304 7.3.1
Med
Practice: Implement Risk Mitigation Plans
39 Provide a method for tracking open risk-handling options 
when monitored risks exceed the defined thresholds
CMMI SP3.2-1 sub-
practice 2, ISO:14971 
3.5, 6.7 & A.2.3.5
Med
40 Invoke selected risk-handling options when monitored risks 
exceed the defined thresholds
CMMI SP3.2-1 sub-
practice 3, ISO:14971 
6.1 to 6.7
Med
41 Establish a schedule or period of performance for each risk-
handling activity that includes the start date and anticipated 
completion date
CMMI SP3.2-1 sub-
practice 4
1
42 Provide continued commitment of resources for each plan to 
allow successful execution of the risk-handling activities
CMMI SP3.2-1 sub-
practice 5, ISO14971 
3.2 & 3.3
Med
43 Collect performance measures on the risk-handling activities. CMMI SP3.2-1 sub-
practice 6, ISO14971 
3.2
Med
Table 6 summarises the mapping of the MD RM regulations against CMMI® specific 
goal 3 (Mitigate Risks). It may now be determined that in order to satisfy MD 
regulations that not all of sub-practices of this CMMI® goal will have to be performed. 
However, in order to satisfy the objectives of RMCM, 6 additional sub-practices had to 
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be added to ensure the safety element of the MD regulations is captured. Table 5 
illustrates that specific goal 3 of the CMMI® will not be satisfied by following the MD 
regulations (i.e. performing only the RMCM level Med sub-practices) as only 5 of the 8 
CMMI® sub-practices associated with this CMMI® goal are required for RMCM level 
Med and 2 are superseded by more comprehensive MD practices 33 and 34 
respectively.
Table 6: Summary of RMCM Specific Goal 3 – Mitigate Risks
Practice RMCM 
Sub-
Practice 
Numbers
CMMI®
Sub-
practices
CMMI® Sub-practices 
required to meet 
regulatory 
requirements
Additional Sub-practices 
required to meet regulatory 
requirements
Develop  Risk 
Mitigation Plans
30 – 38 3 1 6
Implementing  Risk 
Mitigation Plans
39 – 43 5 4 0
Total 30 – 43 8 5 6
5.3.1. Develop risk mitigation plans
Table 5 includes the complete list of RMCM sub-practices and associated capability 
levels for developing risk mitigation plans. From mapping the MD regulations against 
the CMMI® for this practice, it was discovered that both IEC:62304 and ISO:14971 
request additional sub-practices to those specified by the CMMI®. These are: 
mitigations should be verified and the results of the mitigation verification should be 
documented. Therefore, 2 additional MD specific sub-practices were added in order to 
ensure that the MD RM regulations are adhered to through adopting RMCM.  This 
practice also differed from the previous practices in that two of the CMMI® sub-
practices are not applicable to the RMCM. Unlike CMMI®, the FDA requires that risk 
mitigation plans and contingency plans be developed for all risks. Therefore, it was 
necessary to add another 2 sub-practices (developing mitigation for all risks and
developing contingency plans for all risks). The introduction of these sub-practices 
therefore overrules the more lightweight CMMI® sub-practices as they refer to 
individual and selected risks whereas the new sub-practice refers to all risks. Table 6 
illustrates that developing risk mitigation plans consists of 1 sub-practice that is 
required by both the CMMI® and the MD regulations, 4 sub-practices that are required 
by the CMMI® but not by the MD regulations, and 4 sub-practices that are required by 
the MD regulations but not by the CMMI®.
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Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI® and the MD regulations (see Table 5):
Sub-Practice 30. Based upon FDA guidelines the aim of risk mitigation within a MD 
company is to reduce the severity of the risk, the likelihood of the occurrence, or both. 
Ideally the risk would be eliminated or the severity reduced to a minor level of severity. 
All residual risk is measured against the criteria defined earlier in the RM strategy.  If 
the criteria are not met, then further risk reducing control measures may be applied.  If 
the criteria are met, then it is still the responsibility of the sponsor of the project to 
describe and justify any residual risk.  ISO:14971 states that if the residual risk is 
unacceptable and no additional control measures will reduce the risk further, then a 
risk/benefit analysis must be performed to justify whether the intended use outweighs 
the residual risk.  The evaluation and corresponding data and literature should be 
included in the RM file. Consequently, the acceptable level of residual risk depends 
upon the intended purpose of the MD.  ISO:14971 also requires that the “overall 
residual risk” for the device be assessed to decide if the overall residual risk is 
acceptable. This should be documented in the RM file along with any associated data 
and relevant literature.
Sub-practices required by the CMMI® but NOT by the MD regulations (see Table 5):
Sub-Practice 31. The CMMI® requires an individual or a group to be given 
responsibility for addressing each risk; this is not specified in MD software guidelines. 
Sub-Practice 32. There is no specific MD guideline requesting that a cost-benefit 
analysis has to performed for each risk as compliance with MD safety regulations and 
not cost is the most important factor. 
Sub-practices required by the MD regulations but NOT by the CMMI (see Table 5):
Sub-Practice 33.  Even though the CMMI® requires an overall mitigation plan to be in 
place for each project there is a difference in the thoroughness of the plan. In the case of 
the CMMI®, risk mitigation plans may not have to be produced for each risk (SEI 2006: 
RM SP 3.1-1, sub-practice 4).  In order to comply with MD guidelines the manufacturer 
has to produce a risk control method that will eliminate or reduce the risk to be as low 
as possible. Risk mitigation plans should be developed for all risks.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to add another sub-practice as follows: developing mitigation plans for all 
risks. 
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Sub-Practice 34. The CMMI® requests that contingency plans are produced for only 
selected risks (SEI. 2006: RM SP3.1-1, sub-practice 5). However, as MD guidelines 
deal with safety, the initial approach is to only permit a product to be manufactured if it 
is safe and the remaining risk will not result in injury to the patient, operator, and or 
bystander. In terms of a contingency plan for such risks, the MD guidelines recommend 
using protective measures that do not involve user interaction or supplying warning 
labels, or alternatively a combination of both. It is therefore necessary to add another 
sub-practice as follows: developing contingency plans for all risks. 
Sub-Practice 35: IEC:62304 requires that any system requirements related to the 
control of risks must be added to the requirements document.
Sub-Practice 36: IEC:62304 requires that the MD manufacturer identifies segregation 
between software items, as this is essential for effective risk control .
Sub-Practices 37 & 38. The IEC:62304 and ISO:14971 guidelines request additional 
sub-practices to those specified by the CMMI®. These are:  mitigations should be 
verified and the results of the mitigation verification should be documented. Therefore 
additional sub-practices have to be added to RMCM.  
5.3.2. Implementing risk mitigation plans 
Table 5 includes the complete list of RMCM sub-practices and associated capability 
levels for developing risk mitigation plans. Both the MD regulatory guidelines and the 
CMMI® require that adequate resources and training must be provided for areas within 
the software quality domain such as RM.  ISO:14971 specifies that the results of the 
RM activities should be reviewed at defined intervals to check the suitability and 
effectiveness of the RM process. The CMMI® also specifies that performance measures 
for risk handling activities are established but adds that a schedule should be produced 
for resolving each risk.  This is not mandated within the MD regulations and is 
therefore labelled as a level 1 sub-practice. 
Table 5 illustrates that the RMCM practice for implementing risk mitigation plans 
consists of 4 sub-practices that are required by both the CMMI® and the MD regulations 
(i.e. Level Med), and 1 sub-practice that is required by the CMMI® but not by the MD 
regulations (i.e. Level 1).
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Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI® and the MD regulations (see Table 5):
Sub-Practice 39. Both FDA guidelines and the CMMI® require that risks be monitored 
throughout a project. In fact, to comply with MD regulations, a software company is 
required to demonstrate that all risks may be traced throughout the lifecycle process and 
illustrate the mitigation of risks to an acceptable level. 
Sub-Practice 40. Both FDA guidelines and the CMMI® require a method to be provided 
for tracking risk items to closure or to an acceptable level. FDA guidelines specify a 
number of control methods that may be used either individually or concurrently. The 
first preference control method is to eliminate the risk or reduce the risk by safe design 
or redesign. The second preference is to reduce the risk by introducing protective 
measures within the device itself or manufacturing process that do not require any user 
action. The third method is to reduce the risk by providing adequate user information 
(e.g. warnings) and training.  This is the least preferable method, as it requires 
intervention on the part of the MD user.  GAMP 4 also suggests further strategies which 
include: modification of project strategies such as project structure and makeup, 
increasing testing and complete elimination of the risk driver by changing the 
expectations or requirements.
The MD manufacturer is required to record the steps taken to eliminate or reduce a risk 
(e.g. methods adopted) and also record the results of the verification performed to check 
the effectiveness of the risk control measure.  The manufacturer must indicate the 
severity level of the risk after the risk control method has been implemented and 
verified.  Then a decision is made in relation to comparing the remaining severity level 
for each risk with the acceptance level associated with that risk. If the resultant risk 
severity level is not acceptable, then the risk control process will have to be performed 
again until the risk has been eliminated or the severity level of the risk is deemed 
acceptable. Additionally, the MD manufacturer is required to perform tests to determine 
if any new risks have been introduced during the risk control process. If such tests 
discover any new risks then the RM process will have to be followed for each of these 
risks. After all potential risks have been evaluated a final decision is made in relation to 
the safety of the MD.
Sub-Practice 42. Both FDA and CMMI® require that adequate resources and training be 
provided for areas within the software quality domain such as RM. 
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Sub-Practice 43.  ISO:14971 specifies that the results of the RM activities should be 
reviewed at defined intervals to check the suitability and effectiveness of the RM 
process.  
Sub-practices required by the CMMI® but NOT by the MD regulations (see Table 5):
Sub-Practice 41. The CMMI® also specifies that performance measures for risk 
handling activities are established.  Additionally, it requires that a schedule should be 
produced for resolving each risk.
5.4. Summary of the RMCM Specific Practices
Table 7 provides a summary of the 3 specific goals within the RMCM. There are 43 
specific sub-practices of the RMCM. This consists of 23 CMMI® and 20 MD specific 
sub-practices. In order to satisfy the mandatory MD RM requirements, 35 of these sub-
practices have to be adhered to (15 CMMI® and 20 MD specific sub-practices). 
Therefore level Med of the RMCM contains 35 sub-practices across 3 specific goals. 
Table 7: Summary of the RMCM Specific Goals
Goal RMCM Sub-
Practice 
Numbers
CMMI®
Sub-practices
CMMI® Sub-practices 
required to meet 
regulatory 
requirements
Additional Sub-
practices required to 
meet regulatory 
requirements
Prepare for RM 1 – 16 6 6 10
Identify and Analyse 
Risks
17 – 29 9 4 4
Mitigate Risks 30 – 43 8 5 6
Total 1 – 43 23 15 20
5.5. Generic Goals and Practices
The CMMI® also identifies a number of generic goals and practices and these goals 
form the basis of the RMCM generic goals. At a fundamental maturity or capability 
level it is only necessary to perform the specific base practices. It is interesting to note 
that MD regulations with respect to RM often have a counterpart in the CMMI®. For 
RM the generic goals and practices for capability level 2 (GG 2: Institutionalise a 
Managed Process) are: GP 2.1 Establish Policy; GP 2.2 Plan the process; GP 2.3 
Provide Resources; GP 2.4 Assign Responsibility; GP 2.5 Train People; GP 2.6 
Manage Configurations; GP 2.7 Identify stakeholders; GP 2.8 M&C Process; GP 2.9 
Evaluate Adherence; and GP 2.10 Review.
The FDA regulations state that each manufacturer shall establish the appropriate 
responsibility, authority, and interrelation of all personnel who manage, perform, and 
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assess work affecting quality. It also undertakes to ensure that all work is adequately 
resourced and that staff are trained. After mapping the MD RM regulations against the 
CMMI® generic goals, it may be determined that in order to satisfy MD regulations that 
not all of sub-practices of the CMMI® generic goals have to be performed. However, 6 
out of the 10 practices for goal 2 have to be performed, but none of the practices for 
goals 3,4 or 5 are required in order to satisfy MD regulations. This gives a total of 41 
required practices when combined with the 35 level Med practices from goal 1.  Table 8 
illustrates the goals and practices that have to be performed for each of the RMCM 
generic goals (GG).  
Table 8: RMCM levels for the CMMI® Generic goals
Goal: GG1: Perform the Specific Practices
Practice Activity Number
GP 1.1 Perform Base Practices 1 to 43 – see tables I, III & V
Goal: GG2: Institutionalise a Managed Process
Practice Activity 
Number
Source RMCM 
Level
GP 2.1 Establish Policy 44 CMMI Med
GP 2.2 Plan the process 45 CMMI Med
GP 2.3 Provide Resources 46 CMMI Med
GP 2.4 Assign Responsibility 47 CMMI Med
GP 2.5 Train People 48 CMMI Med
GP 2.6 Manage Configurations 49 CMMI 2 
GP 2.7 Identify stakeholders 50 CMMI Med
GP 2.8 Monitor& Control the Process 51 CMMI 2
GP 2.9 Evaluate Adherence 52 CMMI 2
GP 2.10 Review 53 CMMI 2
Goal: GG3: Institutionalise a Defined Process
GP 3.1 Establish a defined Process 54 CMMI 3
GP 3.2 Collect Improvement Information 55 CMMI 3
Goal: GG4: Institutionalise a Quantitatively Managed Process
GP 4.1 Establish Quantitative Objectives for the Process 56 CMMI 4
GP 4.2 Stabilise Sub-process Performance 57 CMMI 4
Goal: GG5: Institutionalise an Optimising Process
GP 5.1 Ensure Continuous Process Improvement 58 CMMI 5
GP 5.2 Correct Root Causes of Problems 59 CMMI 5
6. Results
Table 9 provides a summary of the specific and generic goals within the RMCM. This 
table illustrates that level Med of the RMCM contains 41 sub-practices. Additionally, 
only 21 of the 39 CMMI® RM sub-practices are included in the RMCM level Med.
With respect to the specific goals and practices of the RM process area, it is clear that 
following the MD regulations will only partially meet the goals of this CMMI® process 
area, with only specific goal 1 being fully satisfied. As might reasonably be expected, 
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there is little guidance provided within the MD regulations for the advanced practices of 
RM. Since failure to perform any specific practice implies failure to meet the specific 
goal, with respect to the CMMI®, it is clear, that the goals of RM within CMMI® cannot 
be obtained by satisfying the MD regulations during software development. However, 
the RMCM shows that 35 specific sub-practices would have to be performed in order to 
satisfy MD regulations and that only an additional 8 sub-practices would be required in 
order to satisfy all the CMMI® level 1 (or RMCM level 1) requirements. But is the 
opposite true, can meeting the CMMI® goals for RM successfully meet the MD 
software regulations?  Meeting the goals of the RM process area by performing the 
CMMI® specific practices would not meet the requirements of the MD software 
regulations in this area as an additional 20 MD specific sub-practices had to be added to 
meet the objectives of RMCM.  However, companies wishing to further improve their 
RM practices and fulfil all the RM goals and practices required by the CMMI® may 
adopt the 18 additional RMCM sub-practices.
Table 9: Summary of the RMCM Specific and Generic Goals
Goal CMMI®
Activities
CMMI® Activities 
required to meet 
regulatory 
requirements 
Additional Activities 
required to meet 
regulatory 
requirements)
SG 1: Prepare for RM 6 6 10
SG 2: Identify and Analyse Risks 9 4 4
SG 3: Mitigate Risks 8 5 6
GG2: Institutionalise a Managed 
Process
10 6 0
GG3: Institutionalise a Defined Process 2 0 0
GG4: Institutionalise a Quantitatively 
Managed Process
2 0 0
GG5: Institutionalise an Optimising 
Process
2 0 0
Total 39 21 20
7. Conclusions and Future Work
This research has made a number of contributions. It has investigated how thorough 
current MD regulations are in relation to specifying what RM practices MD companies 
should adopt when developing software. This was achieved through performing a 
mapping between the MD regulations and the CMMI® guidelines for RM. We 
discovered that the guidelines specified in the MD regulations will at best, only partially 
meet the goals of this CMMI® process area. However, we cannot state that the CMMI®
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guidelines for RM are more thorough than those specified in the MD regulations as 20 
additional sub-practices are required in order to satisfy the MD regulatory requirements 
associated within RM.  We also identified the potential strengths and weaknesses of the  
CMMI® RM process area in the specific context of MD software. 
Secondly, we developed a Risk Management Capability Model (RMCM) for the MD 
software industry. This model consists of 7 levels of capability. This model will assist 
MD companies to improve their existing RM practices and provide them with a 
pathway to achieving CMMI® certification which could provide them with an 
advantage in a competitive market-place.
As a result of this research three additional questions now require resolving. First, 
will MD companies react favourably to adopting the RMCM? Second, what impact will 
this model have upon RM practices and MD software quality, safety and reliability 
within the MD industry? Third, should similar SPI models be developed for other 
process areas that are pivotal to the development of MD software? We intend to address 
these three questions through performing further research.    
To assist with this research we are currently progressing the development of the 
RMCM. Next, we plan is to trial this model within more MD companies. Our vision is 
to provide a complete SPI framework that is specifically tailored to the needs of the MD 
industry. This SPI framework will consist of a capability model for each process area 
that is relevant to the development of software within the MD software industry 
(RMCM will be one of these capability models). RMCM will support MD companies in 
pursuing a continuous SPI path that will produce more efficient software development 
and safer medical devices in compliance with regulatory requirements.
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